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Abstract
The recent decade’s research on organizational forms has gained important headway in con-
verging upon a few particularly important causes of the new forms that have been observed.
Yet, most studies offer no explicit definition of “organizational form,” and ignore the need to
establish what should count as a “new form.” In order to advance this research, the present
paper therefore aims to provide a preliminary definition of organizational form, developed
along the lines of organizational economics. A typology is provided that allows identification
of alternative forms of organizing in terms of distinct architectures (topology plus dynamic
rules) and a corresponding level of delegation of decision rights.
1 Introduction
The emergence of new organizational forms through history has been a central topic for most
branches of the social sciences, and a key issue for classical works in economics (Schumpeter,
1928, 1934) and economic sociology (Weber, 1978). Until the last decades, however, the arrival
of new forms of organizing was a relatively rare occurrence. Then, “rather quietly,” according to
Romanelli (1991), a large body of literature emerged during the 1980s to consider the emergence
and establishment of new organizational forms.
Romanelli (1991) reviewed a set of widely dispersed literatures encompassing organizational
ecology, economics, institutional sociology, strategic management, and others, to identify three
views of the mechanisms that might generate new organizational forms. In conclusion, the
rather skeptic assessment was offered that no overarching themes could possibly integrate the
great diversity of approaches uncovered in this review. Although one could point to a number
of additional reasons for the observed diversity, Romanelli (1991) emphasized the lack of clarity
and agreement in definitions of the concept of “organizational form” as a basic problem reflecting
insecure conceptual foundations, ambiguity, and methodological disagreement.
In a sentence that deserves much attention, Romanelli (1991, p. 81) argued, “If we want to
know how something comes into being, it seems reasonable that we should be able to identify
the thing when it appears.” Disappointingly, she concluded that this objective is not easily
achieved in current organization theory, and that “the mere imputation of a concept of form
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serves to organize and advance investigation of changes in organizational diversity.” While this is
undoubtedly true, it seems highly questionable if any amount of imputation based on empirical
work can advance the required conceptual definition needed to distinguish between changes in
outward appearances and changes in the essential characters of organizational forms.
Over the ten years that have elapsed since Romanelli’s (1991) review appeared, there has been
an enormous increase in the academic research on new organizational forms, encompassing most
branches of the social sciences. This research includes organization theory (Child & McGrath,
2001; Daft & Lewin 1993; Ilinitch, D’Aveni & Lewin, 1996; McKendrick, David & Carroll, 2001;
Volberda, 1996), strategic management (Nault & Tyagi, 2001), R &D management (Davenport,
Davies, Miller, 1999), marketing (Achrol, 1997; Moller & Rajala, 1999), accountancy theory
(Cecil, Ciccotello, Grant, 1995), organizational economics (Foss & Foss, 2002; Zenger & Hesterly,
1997), and economics (Charness & Levine, 2002; Kole & Lehn, 1997). Most of the studies that
appeared during the 1990s are empirical case studies aiming to uncover important aspects of
the emerging new forms - see e.g. Academy of Management Journal, 2001, Vol. 44(6) and
Organization Science, 1996, Vol. 7(4), Organization Science, 1999, Vol. 10(5). While this
research has certainly met Romanelli’s (1991) concluding call for further empirical studies to
gain insights regarding the appearance of a diversity of new organizational forms, there has not
been much conceptual development to help distinguish between the observed diversity.
Romanelli (1991, p. 81-82) offered a very broad definition of organizational form as “those
characteristics of an organization that identify it as a distinct entity and, at the same time,
classify it as a member of a group of similar organizations.” It is questionable whether most
of the new organizational forms that were uncovered during the last decade can even be clas-
sified according to this minimum definition, however. Therefore, in order to advance research
in new organizational forms beyond futuristic speculation and identification of any deviation
in aspects of organization as new, it is urgent that conceptual criteria are established to allow
distinction between forms. As Child & McGrath (2001) note, social scientists face an embarrass-
ment of riches with literally hundreds of new terms and perspectives introduced during the last
decade. The viewpoint expressed in the present article is that the marginal benefit of additional
new terms and perspectives is approaching zero, whereas the development of secure conceptual
definitions of organizational forms promises great benefits.
In view of the gap between empirical research and theory identified in the literature on new
organizational forms, the purpose of the present article is to further conceptual clarification. This
aim is pursued by identifying a minimum set of characteristics that allow distinction between
alternative forms of organization. Based on a review of the literature on new organizational
forms, the present article identifies organizational economics as a promising starting point to
accomplish this.
According to recent work in organizational economics, the new forms can be defined as hybrid
forms of hierarchy in which decision rights are delegated to lower levels, or hybrid forms of mar-
ket exchange in which elements of hierarchical control appear (Foss & Foss, 2002; Williamson,
1996; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). The present article further defines the architecture of an orga-
nizational form as a structural configuration composed of a collection of members, a collection
of channels through which the members can pass information or control to each other, and a
set of dynamic rules that help define the flow of information or control and thus help define
their decision rights. Using this definition, a simple modeling framework is developed that al-
lows distinction between architectures (structural configurations) supporting different levels of
delegation of decision rights. In addition to the pure market and the pure hierarchy, four classes
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of hybrid organization are identified.
The present article aims to advance the literature on new organizational forms by providing
a typology that allows identification of alternative forms of organizing in terms of distinct ar-
chitectures and the corresponding level of delegation of decision rights. It must be emphasized,
however, that further work remains. In particular, the much-discussed issue of organizational
flexibility as a response to hypercompetition needs further consideration. Based on the modeling
framework developed in Christensen & Knudsen (2002a, 2002b), the present article points out
that the best performing organizational forms are particularly easy to predict under conditions
of hypercompetition. Since these organizational forms appear to be opposites when the expected
profits are positive and negative, however, it is an open question whether organizations should
aim for flexibility or simply accept a dedicated short life-span (see March, 1995).
2 Literature Review
In the following, the literature on new organizational forms is reviewed to infer their causes
and characteristics according to the reported empirical observations. We then proceed to infer
what, according to this literature, defines an organizational form and what makes it new. The
purpose of this review is to identify the elements that must be included in a useful definition of
“organizational form.”
2.1 Causes of new organizational forms
The recent decade’s research in organizational forms has gained important headway in converging
upon a few particularly important causes of the new forms that have been observed. Reflecting
wide agreement in the organization literature, Child & McGrath (2001), in their introduction to
nine articles in a special research forum on new organizational forms, published in the Academy
of Management Journal, pointed to increased information intensity and internationalization as
the main challenges that have resulted in the emergence of the new forms. The mentioned
challenges were usefully grouped into four broad categories: (1) increased interdependence in
interaction among organizations, (2) the possibility of disembodiment of performance from asset
ownership, (3) higher velocity characterizing almost all aspects of organizational functioning, and
(4) changes in power, in terms of a shift from a power-base of tangible assets and inputs to power
derived from possession of knowledge and information.
The widely observed new organizational forms, it is argued, have emerged in response to
these challenges. According to Child & McGrath (2001), the objective of the new form is to
delegate decision rights to where the relevant knowledge and information reside, then to use
information technology (IT) for support. In contract economics, this move of decision rights,
closer to those with information, has been referred to as “the organization redesign solution,”
as opposed to the traditional MIS solution according to which it is information which is moved
closer to the decision maker (Brynjolfsson & Mendelson, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1992;
Nault, 1998). Thus, fundamental advances in IT and measurement technologies have facilitated
a number of observed experiments with organizational form (Nault, 1998; Zenger & Hesterly
1997) that are often referred to by the notion of “new organizational form” (Daft & Lewin 1993),
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and a common characteristic of these experiments is the use of IT in hierarchies to achieve a
decentralization of decision rights (Child & McGrath, 2001; Nault, 1998).
Whereas advances in IT are commonly viewed as a facilitator of new forms, hypercompetition
is seen as the primary cause of their emergence since traditional forms are considered maladap-
tive when massive change, environmental dynamism, and considerable uncertainty are the norm
(Child & McGrath, 2001; Daft & Lewin, 1993; Volberda, 1996). Hypercompetition refers to the
shift in the rules of competition observed through the 1990s (D’Aveni, 1994; Ilinitch, D’Aveni
& Lewin, 1996; Volberda, 1996). It is argued that rapid technological change, the shortening
of product life cycles, and the increasing aggressiveness of competitors have led to increasingly
shorter periods of competitive advantage, punctuated by frequent disruptions. Often, hypercom-
petition is associated with fundamental uncertainty as in Volberda’s (1996, 366-367) proposition
that organizational forms must be flexible under hypercompetition: “In a fundamentally unpre-
dictable environment which may also be dynamic and complex (hypercompetitive), the optimal
form employs a broad flexibility mix dominated by structural and strategic flexibility and has a
nonroutine technology, an organic structure, and an innovative culture.” Volberda (1996) nicely
sums up the argument for flexibility that has been forwarded in much of the literature on new
organizational forms. “In the new mode of hypercompetition rents do not derive from specialized
routines but from adaptive capability. The reason is that, with hypercompetition, competitive
change cannot be predicted but only responded to more or less efficiently, ex post.” (Volberda,
1996, 360, emphasis in original). The identified imperative of firm-level flexibility is, in turn,
stressing the need to maintain some level of organizational consistency. Thus, it has been em-
phasized that organizations must respond to the twin pressures of exploitation and exploration
identified by March (1991). That is, organizations need to exhibit increasing flexibility while
maintaining consistency and reliability (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998; Malnight, 2001, Volberda,
1996). As explained in the following, the problem with this argument is that, unless it is ad-
vanced as ad hoc reasoning, it must be demonstrated that flexibility outperforms rigidity under
conditions of pervasive uncertainty.
2.2 Empirical observations of new organizational forms
Confusion surfaces when Child & McGrath (2001, fn 1) sample a list of the new forms that
have been identified in organization research. This list includes the broader concepts of the
“postbureaucratic” and “postmodern” organization (Clegg, 1990), the “postentrepreneurial or-
ganization” (Kanter, 1989) and the “flexible firm” (Volberda, 1998), as well as more specific
concepts such as “federalism” (Handy, 1992), the “network organization” (Castells, 1996; Nohria
& Eccles, 1992), the “virtual corporation” (Davidow & Malone, 1992), the “reengineered corpo-
ration” (Hammer & Champy, 1993), the “knowledge-creating company” (Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995), the “ambidexterous organization” (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), the “high performance”
or “high-commitment work system” (Garvin & Klein, 1993; Pfeffer, 1998), the “boundaryless
company” (Devanna & Tichy, 1990; Hirschhorn & Gilmore, 1992), the “hybrid organization”
(Borys & Jemison, 1989), and the “transnational solution” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). And
more could be added, such as the learning organization (Garvin, 1993; Slater & Narver, 1995;
Senge, 1990), and the “Born Global” firm (Madsen & Servais, 1997). According to Child &
McGrath (2001), most of these formulations result from case studies of firms that have pio-
neered various organizational innovations, which helps to explain the overlaps and confusion of
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 5
terminology among them.
If we examine the observed changes in organizational characteristics in more detail, an
impressionistic picture with marked features appears, including downsizing (Bowman, Singh,
Useem & Bhadury, 1999), a trend toward more collaborative business relationships (Cannon &
Homburg, 2001; Nault & Tyagi, 2001), network organizations (Achrol, 1997), flexibility achieved
by more organic and temporary work arrangements (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Child, 1997; Hey-
debrand, 1989; Ilinitch, D’Aveni, & Lewin, 1996; Zahra & O’Neill, 1998; Lewin & Volberda,
1999), more nimble governance structures (Kole & Lehn, 1997; Cecil; Ciccotello & Terry, 1995),
decentralization of decision rights (Moller & Rajala, 1999), and new employment contracts char-
acterized by less commitment between employer and employee (Charness & Levine, 2002). From
an organizational economics viewpoint, these observations of new forms can be summarized as
shifts: (1) from hierarchical organization to internal hybrids that operate “horizontally,” e.g. by
delegating decision rights to functional teams and project groups (Achrol, 1997; Moller & Ra-
jala, 1999), and (2) from market organization to external hybrids that include vertical elements,
e.g. by reducing to a minimum the core activities retained within one unit and assigning other
responsibilities to semi-independent units (Child & McGrath, 2001). A third widely noted fea-
ture is the flexibility of the new organizational forms that most empirical studies emphasize as
crucial. Whether further observed organizational features such as the virtual and boundaryless
nature of new organizational forms deserve special mention is debatable, however. As explained
in the following, the virtual nature of the new forms is associated with the observed delegation
of decision rights. As regards the notion of boundaryless organizations, this is perhaps best
viewed as an expression of the fuzzy conceptual definitions of organizational forms rather than
actual empirical fuzziness. However that may be, the bewildering increase in new terms and
perspectives undoubtedly reflects that something new is happening. But it also seems to reflect
the need to develop sharper conceptualizations that can better separate the new from variations
of the familiar.
2.3 Previous definitions of organizational form and what makes it new
While the empirical studies report an impressive number of instances in which organizational
forms deviate from the familiar, it is unquestionably important from a scientific viewpoint to
ascertain whether an observation is a variation of a known form or actually constitute a new.
In order to do this, we need to define an organizational form, and to point out in what way
a new form is different. One would therefore assume that the literature on new organizational
forms had established a common definition of organizational form. Surprisingly, this is not
the case. There are good reasons why it is difficult to establish commonly accepted definitions
of organizational forms (Romanelli, 1991). Yet, it seems problematic to classify an observed
organizational form as “new” until such a definition has been established. Most studies on
new organizational forms offer no explicit definition of “organizational form,” and ignore any
difficulty in establishing what should count as a “new form.” As one of the rare exceptions in
recent organization research, Child & McGrath (2001) approaches a definition of organizational
form that enables distinction between the new and the old.
There are a number of starting points that may help arrive at a useful definition of “orga-
nizational form.” One possibility that seems particularly useful for organization research would
be to start from economic sociology, building on Weber’s (1978) classical categories of forms of
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economic organization. Another related starting point chosen by Child & McGrath (2001) is to
begin with categories of bureaucracy. They define an organizational form as a “bureaucracy”
and argue that its familiar forms include the following characteristics: (1) hierarchical control
and authority relations, (2) relatively fixed boundaries, and (3) top-down authority. Thus an
observed bureaucracy would count as a new form if it negated one or more of these character-
istics. Previously, Heydebrand (1989) had identified the emergence of new organizational forms
with the transformation of the bureaucratic form caused by the transition from industrial to
postindustrial capitalism. According to Heydebrand an organizational form can be defined in
terms of (1) labor power, (2) the object, means, and division of labor, and (3) the control of
labor at both the organizational and institutional levels. The new organizational forms iden-
tified by Heydebrand were characterized by informalism, universalism, weak classification and
framing of options, loose coupling, interdependence and networking, and propagation of a new
corporate culture. These characteristics, it was argued, emerged in order to increase the organi-
zation’s flexibility. Aldrich & Mueller (1981) provided a related and useful sociological definition
of organization form along the dimensions of technology, coordination, and control.
Another possibility would be to start from organizational economics and define form as par-
ticular instances of hybrids between markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975; 1996). This is
what Foss & Foss (2002) aim at in defining two broad classes of new organizational forms as inter-
nal and external hybrids. According to Foss & Foss (2002), an “external hybrid” (Williamson,
1996) relies on market exchanges, but also incorporate elements of hierarchical control. The
“internal hybrid” (Zenger and Hesterly, 1997) is the reverse case where hierarchical forms incor-
porate elements of market control.
The lack of definition of organizational forms and the ignorance of the defining criteria of
what should count as a “new” form are sources of deep problems in the literature on new orga-
nization forms. For example, Whittington, Pettigrew, Peck, Fenton & Conyon (1999) identified
three weaknesses in this literature: (1) a limited mapping of the extent of contemporary organi-
zational change, (2) a confusion about how contemporary changes link together and (3) a lack
of systematic testing of the performance consequences of this kind of change. The remedy of all
three problems requires comparison across studies, which can only be accomplished if researches
use similar definitions of “organizational form.” According to the reviewed literature, there seem
to be two particularly promising starting points, the delegation of decision rights associated with
organizational economics, and the notion of bureaucracy associated with economic sociology. As
a first step in advancing the understanding of what constitutes a new organizational form, the
present article is interested in efficiency properties of organizations and therefore proceeds along
the lines of organizational economics to define the notion of “organizational form.”
3 Toward a definition of organizational form
According to organizational economics, markets and hierarchies (firms) are two distinct forms of
economic organization. One key distinguishing feature is that decision rights are centralized in
the hierarchy, whereas they are decentralized in the market form. Further features are necessary
to provide a useful definition. Thus, it has been emphasized that the institution of property
rights and the possibility that an organization of people can act as a “legal person” are defining
characteristics of the firm, and that the employment contract is further necessary to identify the
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modern capitalist firm (Hodgson, 1998, 2002).
Although recognizing these features as necessary to define the firm, the starting point of
the present article is the allocation of decision rights. Two extremes are identified according to
which the members of an economic organization experience maximum or minimum discretion.
The minimum discretion occurs when only a single organization member (the CEO) can decide
to accept or reject projects on behalf of the organization, whereas any other member can individ-
ually decide neither to ultimately accept nor to ultimately reject a project. This is the instance
of centralized decision rights denoted “centralized hierarchy.” The opposite case, denoted a “pure
market,” involves maximum discretion, which occurs when a member can individually decide to
accept a project on behalf of the organization, but cannot reject without the consent of the other
members. The purpose here is to develop a simple modeling framework that allows distinction
between organizational forms, modeled as architectures whose structural configurations support
different levels of delegation of decision rights, including these two extreme cases.
3.1 Basic Two-Member Organizational Architectures
In order to proceed, the present section introduces the basic two-member organizational archi-
tecture. In section 4, we extend this basic two-member organizational architecture to define an
organizational form as a n-member architecture.
Our definition of an organizational form as a structural configuration is based on the model
of organizational architecture provided by Sah & Stiglitz (1986, 1988). The first model of Sah
& Stiglitz (1986) is limited to two topological structures, each consisting of only two economic
agents. One of these structures, the hierarchy was thought of as a stylized representation of
organization by the firm, whereas the other structure, the polyarchy, could be thought of as a
stylized representation of the market. In the present work, we build on Christensen & Knudsen’s
(2002a, b) generalization of Sah & Stiglitz work to any finite topological structure.
In these models, often referred to as project selection models, the delegation of decision rights
appears as the discretion for individual agents to ultimately accept or reject projects without
interference of other agents. A weaker condition is that an agent may influence the possibility
that other agents accept or reject a project.
The key ingredient in the context presented by Sah & Stiglitz is the agent along with the
realization that agents are fallible when they evaluate the profit potential of projects. Uncer-
tainty is added on behalf of the finite processing capabilities of the agent. This finiteness is an
expression of limits as a characteristic of the decision-maker, to be understood in any possible
way, ranging from the failure to obtain, assimilate, interpret and evaluate information relevant
to a project, to a state of profound uncertainty.
Following the ideas and terminology of Sah & Stiglitz (1986), the basic process of making
a decision goes loosely as follows. A decision-making structure will (repeatedly) be confronted
with a project drawn from an initial portfolio. The project enters the structure through one of
its agents and traverses the structure until it is either rejected or accepted ultimately. Rejection
means that the project is terminated and no profit can be earned from it. Accept means that
the project is realized, symbolized by storing it in a final portfolio, and profit is earned according
to the quality of the project. In both cases a cost is paid for making the decision. If a project
capable of producing any income, thereby reducing the costs and perhaps even produce profit,
is rejected, then the organization made an error, denoted a Type-I error. If, on the other hand,
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the organization accepts a project producing a negative income, it is said to have made a Type-
II error. In both of these cases, the decision was a failure, and in all other cases it was a
success. The ultimate fate of the project depends on how the agents are interconnected, thereby
motivating the study of different organizational architectures. The point raised in the present
paper is that distinct architectures support different levels of delegation of decision rights.
The two basic architectures, the two-member hierarchy and polyarchy, are the simplest non-
trivial structures. Due to the limited possibilities for composing intuitively sound architectures,
they are fairly representative of two-agent structures in general. Starting out with two nodes in
the graph, two obvious (non-cyclic) configurations stand out (from a number of structures to be
labeled as illegal in section 4), namely the two-member hierarchy and polyarchy.
Figure 1 provides a static overview of the graph representing the hierarchy of Sah & Stiglitz,
and its environment, the initial portfolio I and the final portfolio F in which projects accepted
by the hierarchy are stored. The termination node is denoted T , the waste bin where the rejected
projects are dumped forever. The hierarchy represents a serial processing as a project traverses
the structure and it is straightforward to generalize it to n-member hierarchies simply by adding
nodes to the sequence between I and F .
Figure 1: The two-member hierarchy. In order for the graph to accept a project, both agents
must accept the project individually. Or, the other way around, each individual has the ability
to terminate the project.
The distribution of decision rights in the two-member hierarchy shown in Figure 1 can be
inferred from the members’ access to the termination node T and the final portfolio F . Only
one member has direct access to the final portfolio F . Since the ultimate accept of a project
requires direct access to the final portfolio F , only one member has the right to ultimately
accept projects on behalf of the organization. Both members can ultimately reject projects on
behalf of the organization, however, since both members have direct access to the termination
node T . These properties generalize in a straightforward way to n-member hierarchies. In
the n-member hierarchy, only one member can ultimately accept a project on behalf of the
organization, whereas each member can ultimately reject a project on behalf of the organization.
Note further that ultimate acceptance by the agent entitled to do so, requires that all the other
agents must also have accepted the project. The hierarchy thus supports an allocation of decision
rights that can be summarized as n rejection edges leading from the individual agents to the
termination node T , and one acceptance edge leading jointly from the n agents to the final
portfolio F .
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In contrast to the simple hierarchy, the polyarchy, shown in Figure 2, has a more specialized
behavior and is more difficult to generalize in an unambiguous way. Since polyarchies represent a
parallel processing, the agents must have the same level of competence. This can be modeled in
various ways. The agents may incorporate a level of competence in their internal state such that
all agents of matching competence belong to the same polyarchy. Alternatively, and in order
to keep the simple picture of agents and channels of communication with no internal structure,
three types of edges can be used – accept, standard reject and polyarchy reject. Such a setup
allows for the type of polyarchy of Sah & Stiglitz, but additional rules of traversal, the dynamics
of the architecture, must be supplied to ensure the polyarchy behavior.
Figure 2: The two-member polyarchy of Sah & Stiglitz. Here, the project is sent to any of the
agents at random. The individual can accept the project on behalf of the graph, but in order to
get an overall reject, both agents must reject. This behavior cannot be observed from the graph
topology alone but is partly implemented in the dynamic rules that constrain the traversal.
We also infer the distribution of decision rights in the two-member polyarchy shown in Figure
2 from the members’ access to the termination node T and the final portfolio F . In the polyarchy,
both members have direct access to the final portfolio F , and thus have the right to ultimately
accept projects on behalf of the organization. None of these members can individually reject
projects on behalf of the organization, however, since they only have access to the termination
node T through the other agent. The two-member polyarchy thus supports an allocation of
decision rights that can be summarized as 2 acceptance edges leading from the individual agents
the final portfolio F , and one rejection edge leading jointly from the 2 agents to the termination
node T .
Problems arise when considering polyarchies of 3 or more members. It is not obvious how
the agents are interconnected inside the polyarchy neither in what temporal order they evaluate
a project. Here it is important to note that these properties are related to the architecture as a
whole and cannot (in the general case) be extracted from the topology of the graph alone. In
order to extend the Sah & Stiglitz polyarchy to include 3 or more members, added specification
must be provided, and the actual choice of specification reflects, among other properties, the
internal structure and the causal type of the graph. We will use Christensen & Knudsen (2002a)
to define the required specifications.
Sah & Stiglitz further defined a unifying sub-structure called a committee of n members
and consensus k. This sub-structure was constructed by picking a polyarchical structure and
supplying a dynamic rule according to which the organization should accept only if k or more
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agents evaluate the project positively. The invention of the n-member committee of consensus k
was both a generalization of the two basic structures and a unification of the two into a common
framework.
4 Modeling Organizational Forms as n-Member Architectures
The following section 4.1 provides a definition of organizational form as a n-member architec-
ture. The mathematical description of the system to be modeled has two intimately connected
facets, a physical structure and a set of dynamic rules. These two facets must always be com-
patible and support/reflect the phenomena to be studied. Thus, section 4.2 turns the attention
toward structural components and dynamic rules. Section 4.3 then explains how the allocation
of decision rights can be modeled in an n-member architecture, and section 4.4 proceeds to es-
tablish correspondence between organizational architectures and the allocation of decision rights.
4.1 A Definition of Organizational Form
We define an organizational form as a n-member architecture, which is: a collection of members,
a collection of channels through which the members can pass information or control to each
other, and a set of dynamic rules that help define the flow of information or control and thus
help define their decision rights. The purpose of an organizational form as considered here is to
make decisions regarding whether to accept or reject projects, and these decisions have economic
consequences. Decision rights are introduced as the right to ultimately accept or reject a project
on behalf of the architecture. Since the present article is concerned with the definition of
alternative economic organizations, we need to be clear about the meaning of acceptance and
rejection within this context.
Acceptance or rejection of a project on behalf of an economic organization refers to the
exchange of property rights and to the exchange of rights to determine the use of human resources
within some bounds (we do not consider slavery). Drawing on Hodgson’s (2002) useful definition
of firms and markets, an economic organization is further defined as an entity in which regular
exchange of property rights takes place within a framework of law. Thus markets and firms
are types of economic organization. In markets, two or more legal entities exchange property
rights. These legal entities can be self-employed individuals or firms. A firm can be defined
as (Hodgson, 2002, p. 56): “...an integrated and durable organization involving two or more
people, acting openly or tacitly as a ‘legal person’, capable of owning assets, set up for the
purpose of producing goods or services, with the capacity to sell or hire these goods or services
to customers.”
In the following, we are going to consider alternative forms of economic organization. These
organizations will consist of a number of agents (self-employed individuals, employees, or firms)
that exchange goods and exchange rights to determine the use of human resources within some
bounds. We are further going to identity six classes of economic organization. One is referred
to as the “pure market”. The others are described as hierarchies and hybrids. These terms
represent different degrees of decentralization of decision rights and correspond to new forms
of economic organization as identified in the literature (Foss & Foss, 2002). Consistent with
the definition of firms and markets used in the present article, “hybrids” represent economic
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organizations with different degrees of relational exchange (Hodgson, 2002) situated in a firm
(internal hybrids) or in a market (external hybrids).1
According to our definition, the form of an economic organization can be thought of as a
particular structural configuration of connected members that have established rules for pass-
ing information or control of projects exchanged by the organization. Further specification is
provided in the following.
The architecture of an economic organization can be represented by a graph consisting of
nodes and edges (Christofides, 1975). In such a representation each node corresponds to an
individual or more generally to the basic building block, the simplest constituent, here denoted
an agent. These agents can have very different properties depending on the specifics of the
model. Similarly, each edge represents a channel of communication to another agent or more
generally the passing of information or control to another unit, and it is here denoted a choice
because agents must pick only one during the individual decision process. These choices will also
be equipped with certain characteristics to incorporate realistic features into the model system.
The basic process of making a decision was described above in section 3.1. The project quality
is determined by the initial portfolio, and detailed cost considerations may be an important part
of a model too, since they are closely related to the measuring of performance, and since they
represent assumptions on time scales, parallel processing capabilities and employment strategies
of agents.
In terms of the graph representing the structure, an input (I), an output (F ) and a termi-
nation (T ) node are introduced. These external nodes are of a different type than the internal
nodes representing agents, as they represent the environment or store historical information
about the system. The projects are drawn from the initial portfolio and may be represented
by a d dimensional vector, ~x, encoding the relevant information available to the agents and to
the organization as an entity. It may even store dynamic information on the decision process
itself. The simplest project description is just the real number (d = 1) describing the income
(excluding the cost of the decision process itself) produced by the project in case of acceptance.
The decision-making process is realized by traversing the graph from the input node to either
the output or to the termination node. Such a connected path of subsequent choices is simply
denoted a decision. The overall picture is illustrated in Figure 3, where the edges must be
interpreted loosely, because a decision-making structure can have several entry points as well as
more than one path may lead to acceptance or rejection.
4.2 Graph Components and Dynamics
The basic constituents of the framework is described in Christensen & Knudsen (2002a). Here
we will introduce a part of this material in order to pursue the aim of the present article.
4.2.1 The Cost Model
The explicit cost of making a decision is important to include because it facilitates comparison
of graphs across sizes and families, and because it sets a scale on which to measure profit. The
architecture is viewed as the brain of a larger and more directly productive apparatus, and
as such it has its own internal accounts (a cost is paid for evaluating a project even if the
production apparatus is never started). Three basic models were proposed in Christensen &
Knudsen (2002a): (1) Large-scale operation costs (fixed per time unit), (2) Employment costs
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(scales linearly with the number of agents), and (3) Free-lance costs (scales linearly with the
number of active agents).
Starting from the bottom of the list, the free-lance cost model reflects small organizations
that demand very specific and rapidly varying (over time) competences from its employees. The
second model, the employment cost, simulates organizations with a fixed staff, either because
the organization is big enough to cover all fields of competence needed or, reversely, because
there is only a very few fields of competence in the niche. This cost model can be used to
effectively model parallel processing of projects in time, since generally not all agents are active
during a single decision. Finally, with the large-scale operation cost the other extreme has been
covered, that is, the situation where the organization is large and where several similar projects
can be treated simultaneously implying relatively low overall expenses for each project. Again,
this model can be used to effectively model parallel processing, and the incoming projects should
now be viewed as multi-project cases2.
4.2.2 The Initial Portfolio
A project may be represented by a d dimensional vector, ~x, encoding the relevant information
available to the agents and to the organization as an entity. It may also leave room for internal
evaluation data as long as an initial default state is uniquely given. The quality of a project is
the potential for profit calculated by some scalar field
P : <d → < (1)
This potential profit includes all costs of production, effectuation or implementation, but ex-
cludes the cost of making the decision whether to realize the project or not, because this cost
may depend on the architecture or even the specifics of the decision process. In the simplest
case, the project is simply represented by the single scalar value, x, measuring its potential for
profit.
The initial portfolio represents any part of the external environment that has nothing to do
with the costs of making the decision itself. Thus it reflects the information, resources, available
Figure 3: A static overview of the graph G, representing a decision-making structure, and its
environment, the initial portfolio I, the final portfolio F , and the termination node T .
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technology, political circumstances and market dynamics. It, and not the organization itself,
defines the (available) projects, whose values are determined by a given income distribution G.
4.2.3 Agents and Choices
An agent, represented by a node in the graph, is the basic unit of the decision-making structure.
Moreover, the single agent is the simplest, non-trivial structure that can be formed. The task
of the agent is to receive projects, evaluate or “screen” them and, according to the screening,
dispatch the projects along the appropriate channels of communication available to the agent.
The actual channel used corresponds to a single edge in the graph and represents the agents
choice of what to do with the project. The evaluation of the project by the individual agent is
described by a mapping from the project space into the closed real unit interval representing a
Bayesian probability
f : <d → [0, 1] (2)
This agent screening function can be interpreted in several ways, depending on the imposed
dynamics. The simplest choice of a screening function is a hard-coded function representing
the static properties of the agent. But as internal state and memory of agents is incorporated,
reflecting experience and the ability to learn, it may not even be a true function (unless the agent,
the history and even the graph are accepted as arguments as well). Nevertheless, the outcome
of the screening should always be accept or reject, possibly followed by a transformation
T : <d → <d (3)
of the project ~x. What happens to the project next is determined by the topology of the graph
and the specifics of the dynamics.
The project transformation of equation (3) represents the process of adding or distorting
information during the process of communication or even the direct manipulation of the initial
project, whether this is an attempt to improve the project or simply an update of internal
evaluation data.
Since the choices (edges) can have various, both statical and dynamic, properties similar
to the agents (nodes), our proposed definition of organizational form can be used to develop
rigorous and yet realistic models of business organizations.
4.2.4 Invariants
In order to maintain realism in the use of graphs as representatives for decision-making models
Christensen & Knudsen (2002a) pinned down the following seven invariants: (1) The graph
is directed, finite and connected, (2) there exists one external node I having only out-bound
acceptance edges to internal nodes, (3) there exists one external node F having only in-bound
acceptance edges, from internal nodes, (4) there exists one external node T having only in-bound
rejection edges from internal nodes, (5) each internal node must have at least one acceptance
edge, (6) each internal node must have at least one rejection edge, and (7) the external node F
or T must be reachable from any internal node.
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As explained in Christensen & Knudsen (2002a), additional structural criteria may be ap-
plied to further restrict the type of model being considered and in order to exclude non-intuitive
constructs. It is further important to extend the finiteness requirement of the graph to the dy-
namic rules. In particular it must be noted that cyclic architectures may result in infinite loops,
which are obviously infeasible as it requires a finite time for each agent to evaluate a project3.
Additional issues to be considered are causality, time-ordering and the possibility of feedback
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2002a). Armed with this overview of the framework developed in
(Christensen & Knudsen, 2002a, b), we now proceed to consider the possible correspondence
between organizational n-member architectures and the allocation of decision rights.
4.3 Allocation of Decision Rights for n-member Architectures
On the basis of the modeling framework developed in Christensen & Knudsen (2002a) we have
provided the basis for considering the allocation of decision rights in n-member structures.
The method used to infer the architecture’s support of decision rights was outlined in section
3.1. The members can either be allocated the right to ultimately accept or reject a project
on behalf of the organization. The right to ultimately terminate a project is represented as a
direct access from the member to the termination node T , and the right to ultimately reject
is represented as a direct access to the final portfolio F . Here, direct access means that the
project after acceptance or rejection appears with probability 1 in the termination node T or
the final portfolio F . Accordingly, as mentioned in section 3.1, the n-member hierarchy supports
a delegation of decision rights that can be summarized as n rejection edges leading from the
individual agents to the termination node T , and one acceptance edge leading jointly from the n
agents to the final portfolio F .
It was further mentioned that the two-member polyarchy supports an allocation of decision
rights that can be summarized as two acceptance edges and one rejection edge (in terms of two
indirect rejection edges by way of the other agent). What about the n-member polyarchy?
As indicated above, one possibility chosen here (in order to keep the simple picture of agents
and channels of communication with no internal structure), three types of edges are used –
accept, standard reject and polyarchy reject. But we need to add a further rule of traversal in
order to ensure the polyarchy behavior. The rule chosen here is that in the case of polyarchy
rejection, a project is sent to the nearest neighbor, if any, to which the member is connected by
a polyarchy edge. Only when all the members connected by polyarchy edges reject a project, is
it ultimately rejected. All members connected by polyarchy rejection edges can accept a project,
but termination can only happen if each and everyone rejects the project. In case of acceptance,
the project travels to the next hierarchical layer or is ultimately accepted, i.e. stored in the
final portfolio F . Using this definition, the n-member polyarchy supports a delegation of decision
rights that can be summarized as n acceptance edges leading from the individual agents to the
final portfolio F , and one rejection edge leading jointly from the n agents to the termination
node T .
4.4 Identifying a Correspondence Between Architecture and Decision Rights
So far, two pure architectures have been provided: the n-member hierarchy, and the n-member
polyarchy. Here we introduce four additional distinct classes of architectures that correspond to
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the following classes of economic organization identified in the literature: centralized hierarchies,
internal hybrids, external hybrids, and the pure market. The purpose is to show that the classes
of architecture support increasing (decreasing) levels of delegation of decision rights. In order
to compare the level of delegation we sum the number of edges that lead to ultimate acceptance
and rejection of a project. By “ultimate acceptance” we mean that an organization member
dispatches a project to the final portfolio F , and by “ultimate rejection” we mean that a member
dispatches a project to the termination node T . The architectures discussed in the following
encompass graphs that are consistent with the invariants listed in section 4.2.4.
The centralized hierarchy. A centralized hierarchy is an architecture in which only one
member has the right to ultimately accept projects. This member is said to reside at the highest
hierarchical layer. The pure hierarchy discussed in the above is a special case of the centralized
hierarchy, and if the architecture only has two members, the two forms are identical. In terms
of allocation of decision rights, there are two extremes of the centralized hierarchy. First, the
maximum delegation of decision rights occurs when all the members at a lower hierarchical layer
are each connected to the member at the highest hierarchical layer but are mutually unconnected.
In this case, there are n edges that lead to ultimate rejection and one edge leading to ultimate
acceptance of a project. In case just two lower level members were mutually connected there
would be n-1 edges that lead to ultimate rejection and one edge leading to ultimate acceptance.
At the opposite extreme, the minimum delegation of decision rights occurs when all the members
at lower hierarchical layers are each connected to the member at the highest hierarchical layer
and also mutually connected by polyarchy rejection edges. In this case, there are two edges
leading to ultimate rejection (one is the combined effect of the polyarchy edges) and one edge
leading to ultimate acceptance.
Figure 4: The six classes of organizational form establishing correspondence between the delega-
tion of decision rights and economic architecture.
The internal hybrid. An internal hybrid is an architecture in which k of n members (1
< k < n) have the right to ultimately accept projects. As opposed to the external hybrid,
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described below, these k members are connected by a polyarchy edge and thus have the same
level of competence. That is, in the internal hybrid, the k members residing at the highest
hierarchical layer can only reject a project on behalf of the organization if all agree it must be
dumped. By contrast, if only one member residing at the highest hierarchical layer accepts the
project, it is accepted by the organization. There are two extremes of the internal hybrid. First,
the maximum delegation of decision rights occurs when all the members at lower hierarchical
layers are each connected to one member at the highest hierarchical layer, but are mutually
unconnected. In this case, there are n-(k-1) edges that lead to ultimate rejection and k edges
leading to ultimate acceptance of a project, i.e. a total of n + 1 edges leading to an ultimate
decision. At the opposite extreme, the minimum delegation of decision rights occurs when all the
members at lower hierarchical layers (as in the example shown in Figure 4) are each connected
to one of the members at the highest hierarchical layer and are also mutually connected by
polyarchy rejection edges. In this case, there are two rejection edges (one is the combined effect
of the polyarchy edges) and a minimum of k acceptance edges (the maximum in this case is n-1
acceptance edges if all members but one were residing at the highest level).
The external hybrid. An external hybrid is defined as an architecture in which k of n (1
< k < n) members have the right to ultimately accept projects. As opposed to the internal
hybrid, these k members are mutually unconnected. In the external hybrid, the k members
residing at the highest hierarchical layer can therefore individually reject and accept a project
on behalf of the organization (complete autonomy of each of the k members at the highest level).
We also find two extremes of the external hybrid. First, the maximum delegation of decision
rights occurs when only a single member at a lower hierarchical layer is connected to k=n-1
members that all reside at the highest hierarchical layer. In this extreme case, there are n edges
that lead to ultimate rejection and n-1 edges leading to ultimate acceptance of a project. As
more members are located at lower levels, the number of edges leading to ultimate rejection or
acceptance decreases. At the opposite extreme, the minimum delegation of decision rights occurs
when all the members at lower hierarchical layers are each connected to one of the k members
at the highest hierarchical layer and are also mutually connected by polyarchy rejection edges.
In this case, there are k+1 rejection edges (one is the combined effect of the polyarchy edges
at the lower level) and a minimum of k acceptance edges (also in this case the maximum is n-1
acceptance edges if all members but one were residing at the highest level).
The pure market. The pure market is defined as an architecture in which all n members
have the right to ultimately accept and reject projects. This extreme architecture is simply
a collection of n unconnected members. In this case, there are n edges that lead to ultimate
acceptance or rejection.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the six classes of organizational form. These six cases
define six distinct classes of organizational architecture (and thus organizational form as defined
here). As explained in the following, the six classes of architecture also support a ranking of
increasing (decreasing) levels of delegation of decision rights. The pure market has the maximum
delegation of decision rights, whereas the minimum occurs in the centralized hierarchy.
From Table 1, the following relations can be established for n > 2 and k > 1 (tighter relations
can be established in some instances, but this leads to a less clean picture):
1. PMMax > EHMax > PHMax.
2. PMMin > EHMin ∧ EHMin > PHMin for k > n/2.
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Architecture PH: Pure Hierarchy CH: Centralized Hierarchy
Max. Dec. PHMax: n+ 1 CHMax: n+ 1
Min. Dec. PHMin: n+ 1 CHMin: 3
Architecture EH: External Hybrid IH: Internal Hybrid
Max. Dec. EHMax: 2n− 1 IHMax: n+ 1
Min. Dec. EHMin: 2k + 1 IHMin: k + 2
Architecture PM: Pure Market PO: Polyarchy
Max. Dec. PMMax: 2n POMax: n+ 1
Min. Dec. PMMin: 2n POMin: n+ 1
Table 1: Levels of Delegation for Alternative Architectures (1<k<n).
3. POMax = IHMax = CHMax.
4. POMin > IHMin > CHMin.
7. PHMax = CHMax ∧ PHMin > CHMin.
8. EHMax > IHMax ∧ EHMin > IHMin.
9. PMMax > POMax ∧ PMMin > POMin.
Thus, decision rights tend to be increasingly decentralized as we move from the top to the
bottom, and from the right to the left, in Table 1. Moreover, the minimum decentralization
occurs in the pure hierarchy, and the maximum in the pure market. We have thus established
that distinct alternative architectures can be ranked according to their support of a level of
delegation of decision rights.
5 Discussion
We have shown that distinct alternative architectures can be ranked according to their support
of a level of delegation of decision rights. As mentioned above, recent works in organizational
economics define new organizational forms as hybrid forms of hierarchy in which decision rights
are delegated to lower levels, or hybrid forms of market exchange in which elements of hierarchical
control appear (Foss & Foss, 2002; Williamson, 1996; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). The contribution
of the present article is to define six distinct classes of architecture that can be ranked according
to their support of alternative levels of decision rights. When we speak of a new organizational
form, it is now possible to define wherein some aspect of the new lies, i.e. in terms of a previously
unknown hybrid.
The definition of organizational form advanced here can, therefore, be used as a basis for
an empirical classification of the forms of organizing that have emerged through history. As
an example, we will consider the study of network organization in marketing during the past
three decades (Achrol & Kotler, 1999). The early work studied networks by mapping patterns
of interpersonal ties, often occurring as a collection of dyadic bonds. According to Achrol &
Kotler (1999), the emergence of large-scale managed networks in recent years can be associated
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with a significant shift in the basis of network research, in terms of a move away from studying
networks as informal relations to studying them as formal governance structures. The present
work offers a definition of organizational form in terms of organizational architecture, and an
approach to classification of architectures that can help advance this line of research. The
empirical research we have in mind is therefore consistent with the emerging new conceptual
basis of marketing theory, according to which networks are studied as alternatives to the classical
governance structures, the market and the hierarchy.
Achrol & Kotler (1999) usefully defined four types of networks: internal networks, vertical
networks, intermarket networks, and opportunity networks. According to Achrol & Kotler
(1999), an internal market network is designed to reduce hierarchy and open firms to their
environments. Achrol & Kotler (1999, 149) defined the internal market network as “a firm
organized into internal enterprise units that operate as semiautonomous profit centers buying
from, selling to, or investing in other internal and external units as best serves their needs on
market-determined terms of trade but subject to firm policy.” This definition is consistent with
the class of the internal hybrid identified in the present work. What we add here, apart from the
classification, is the possibility of evaluating how this structure will influence the firm’s ability
to select projects, and thus its performance (Christensen & Knudsen 2002a, 2002b show how
the performance of any economic architecture can be evaluated).
Achrol & Kotler (1999) further argued that the vertical network maximizes productivity of
serially dependent functions by creating partnerships among independent skill-specialized firms.
The vertical market network was defined as comprising “a group of resource firms specializing in
the various products, technologies, or services that constitute the inputs of a particular industry,
organized around a focal company (sometimes a ‘virtual’ company) that focuses on monitoring
and managing the critical contingencies faced by the network participants in that market.”
Achrol & Kotler (1999, 152-3). This definition would be consistent with the class of the external
hybrid identified in the present work if multiple independent focal companies acted to focus
activities. If only one firm is acting as the focal unit, however, we classify the vertical network
as an instance of the centralized hierarchy. Regarding Achrol & Kotler’s (1999) intermarket
network, this represents a shift in the unit of analysis, and thus the scope of the network. Since
the intermarket network encompasses multiple focal companies, it is consistent with the external
hybrid defined in the present work. Finally, Achrol & Kotler (1999) consider networks designed
to optimize customer opportunity organized around a central clearing house. According to this
description, the opportunity network can be viewed as an instance of the internal hybrid or
perhaps, in extreme cases, the centralized hierarchy.
There are limitations that need to be addressed before comprehensive empirical classification
can be accomplished, however. Among these are: (1) the range and degree of coordination of
the activities that business organizations are engaged in, and (2) the need for renewal of the
activities, and the organizational architecture that support these activities. We will consider
each topic in turn.
5.1 The Scope and Coordination of Multiple Activities
In the literature on new organizational forms, the rationale given for their emrgence is the need
to maintain flexibility in an increasingly global and hypercompetitive environment. The organi-
zations in the new hypercompetitive environment must adapt to rapidly shifting opportunities
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or perish. Furthermore, the organizations need to maintain a stable course despite increasing
their capability to adapt. Finally, organizations need to organize around an increasingly diverse
portfolio of functions, technologies, and customer wants (Achrol & Kotler’s, 1999). Therefore, it
is argued, the new emerging organizations increase their ability to adapt, they maintain stabil-
ity despite frequent adaptation by focusing on meta-stability, and they mange diversity through
layered networks (Achrol & Kotler, 1999). While this diagnosis is probably true, the possible
solutions could turn out to be problematic (March, 1995). The problem here is whether the
costs of adaptation, flexibility and coordination may outweigh the benefits.
In the following section, we consider this issue by identifying two distinct aspects of orga-
nizing that might be adapted, the structure of decision rights among organization members,
and the members’ decision making competence. Finally, we examine the profitability of the
six classes of organizational architecture identified in Table 1. On this basis, it is pointed out
that there are only two optimal forms of organizing under conditions of pervasive uncertainty,
the pure hierarchy and the pure polyarchy. Since these structures are opposites, adaptation
between them requires a maximum of switching costs. In view of the obstacles associated with
adaptation it is, therefore, an open question whether organizations should aim for flexibility or
simply accept a dedicated short life-span (see March, 1995).
5.2 Renewal of Activities and Organizational Architecture
At this point, it is useful to briefly summarize the ground covered so far. According to our
definition of an organizational form, it is a topological structure (a collection of members and a
collection of channels through which the members can pass information or control to each other)
and a set of dynamic rules imposed on that structure that help define the members’ decision
rights. As pointed out in the above, an organizational form is engaged in exchange and can
usefully be modeled as a sound (i.e. consistent with the invariants mentioned in section 4.2.4)
directed, finite and connected graph. This graph pays a cost to exist (according to a particular
cost model), faces a project distribution (a market choice), and its members may alter the quality
of the projects (project transformation) during their evaluation of projects.
When we speak of organizational forms as new, we may therefore refer to: (1) topology, (2)
dynamic rules, (3) the cost model, (4) the market choice (the distribution and dimensionality of
projects), (5) the delegation of rights to alter project quality, or (6) to the rate of change in any
of these aspects of organizational form.5 The present paper identifies the topology and dynamic
rules as the basic criteria for definition and classification of organizational forms. The further
aspects of organization mentioned in (3)-(6) are best viewed as additional criteria that may help
identify emergent shades of economic organization.
Recently, it has been emphasized that the competitive world is characterized by “hypercom-
petition,” a state of the world associated with fundamental uncertainty. It has further been
proposed that organizational forms must be increasingly flexible under hypercompetition (e.g.
Volberda, 1996). If we associate hypercompetition with fundamental uncertainty, agents do not
know the value of a project. At the limit, the agent decides what to do on the basis of hunch. In
this situation, the screening function of the agent is a constant (representing the absence of per-
ceived difference between projects) and the organizational form is particularly easy to predict.
It can thus be shown (Christensen & Knudsen, 2002a, 2002b) that the n-member hierarchy and
polyarchy (see Figure 4) are the optimal forms that bound any sound finite structure. In good
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times (positive project value), polyarchies will dominate, and in bad times (negative project
value), polyarchies will dominate.
Even if it were not the case that decision makers operated on hunch, it can be shown that
the agents should organize in an n-member hierarchy in bad times (negative project value), and
should choose the n-member polyarchy in good times (positive project value), the number n in
both instances depending on cost considerations.6 Contradicting recent claims, organizational
forms are thus particularly easy to predict when the oscallations of the business cycle become
more extreme or agents experience pervasive uncertainty. Perhaps, the tendency to organize
in flat structures observed through the 1990s was simply reflecting the upswing of the business
cycle that would favor polyarchies.
Since these organizational forms are opposites when the expected profits are positive and
negative, however, it is an open question whether organizations should aim for flexibility or
simply accept a dedicated short life-span (see March, 1995). Unless the switching costs are
negligible, we should expect rather persistent compromises (in terms of topology and dynamic
rules) or increased rates of failure as the business cycle swings. These considerations appear to
seriously question the wisdom of compromise and flexibility expressed in the literature on new
organizational forms, an issue that must be addressed in future research.
6 Conclusion
According to the last decade’s literature on organizational forms, a number of causes under-
lie the emergence of new forms. The widely observed new organizational forms, it is argued,
have emerged in response to increased information intensity and internationalization. Yet, nu-
merous aspects of organization have been emphasized as new, pointing to insecure conceptual
foundations, ambiguity, and methodological disagreement.
While the empirical studies on new organizational forms report an impressive number of
instances in which new forms deviate from the familiar, we need to define an organizational form,
and to point out in what way a new form is different. There are good reasons why it is difficult
to establish commonly accepted definitions of organizational forms, yet, it seems problematic to
classify an observed organizational form as “new” until such a definition has been established.
Most studies on new organizational forms offer no explicit definition of “organizational form,”
and ignore any difficulty in establishing what should count as a “new form.”
The recent decade’s research in organizational forms has gained important headway in con-
verging upon a few particularly important causes of the new forms that have been observed. In
order to further advance this research, the present paper has aimed to provide a preliminary
definition of organizational forms, developed along the lines of organizational economics. Thus,
we advanced a broad definition of organizational form as a collection of members, a collection
of channels through which the members can pass information or control to each other, and a set
of dynamic rules that help define the flow of information or control and thus help define their
decision rights. Decision rights were further defined in terms of the member’s right to ultimately
accept or reject a project on behalf of the architecture.
The strength of this definition is that it establishes a typology that allows identification of
alternative forms of organizing (in terms of topology and dynamic rules), and the corresponding
level of delegation of decision rights. Thus, a particular choice of allocation of decision rights
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dictates a particular organization structure (topology and dynamic rules), and vice versa. The
proposed definition further opens the possibility of modeling how alternative choices regarding
the cost model, the market choice, and the delegation of rights to alter project quality will
influence performance. A further issue pertains to the evaluation of compromise and flexibility
versus switching costs.
Whereas the mere imputation of a concept of form may serve to organize and advance
investigation of changes in organizational diversity, it would be better if we knew a form before
we had seen it. The present article has offered a preliminary attempt to define organizational
forms that may help a move in this direction.
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Endnotes
1 Since the “polyarchy” of Sah & Stiglitz is best viewed as one legal entity (agents do not have
the right to individually accept and reject projects), we consider this special structure as a particular
instance of an internal hybrid. Sah & Stiglitz (1986), by contrast, presented the polyarchy as a stylized
representation of the market.
2 The approach of projects consisting of similar sub-projects in some limits leads to Gaussian income
distributions, whence it biases the project distribution of the initial portfolio.
3 Finiteness of cyclic graphs can be achieved by counting the number of evaluations by agents in
total, by polyarchies in total or by individual agents. Whenever a finite maximal count is reached, some
default behavior leading to ultimate acceptance or rejection should be activated.
4 The strict version of outward determinism results in trivial graphs that either accept or reject every
project.
5 Note here that the delegation of decision rights that underlie the six classes of organizational form
identified above (illustrated in Figure 4) concern topology and dynamic rules.
6 See (Christensen & Knudsen, 2002b) for a proof.
